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NOTES
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF
INTERJURISDICTIONAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO SECTION 707 OF THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
The Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws1 has been completed and submitted to Con-
gress.2 The Final Report includes a Proposed Federal Criminal Code,3
which is presently under consideration by the Senate Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures.4 Sections 707 and 708 of the Code
deal with the issue of successive federal and state prosecutions for the
same act in cases of concultrent jurisdiction.5 These sections attempt
1 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws was constituted
and given responsibility for the study and reform of federal criminal laws. Pub. L. No.
89-801, §§ 2-10, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966).
2 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT. A
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE i (1971) [hereinafter cited as PRoposEn CODE].
8 See id. See generally McClellan, The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code,
57 A.B.A.J. 585 (1971).
4 See Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 8, at 931-84, 946, 1173-75, 1280-84, 1445-97 (1972).
5 § 707. FORMER PROSECUToN IN ANOTHER JURIsDICrION: WHEN A BAR
When conduct constitutes a federal offense and an offense under the law of a
local goverment or a foreign nation, a prosecution by the local government or
foreign nation is a bar to a subsequent federal prosecution under either of the
following circumstances:
(a) the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction as
defined in section 704(a) and (c) or was a barring termination under section
704(d) and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct or arose
from the same criminal episode, unless (i) the law defining the offense of
which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted is intended to pre-
vent a substantially different harm or evil from the law defining the offense
for which he is subsequently prosecuted, or (ii) the second offense was not
consummated when the first trial began; or
(b) the first prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final
order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed,
or vacated and which necessarily required a determination inconsistent with
a fact or a legal proposition which must be established for conviction of the
offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted;
unless the Attorney General of the United States certifies that the interests of the
United States would be unduly harmed if the federal prosecution is barred. In
this section, "local" means of or pertaining to any of the 50 states of the United
States or any political unit within any of the 50 states.
§ 708. SUBSEQUENT PROSECUrION BY A LOCAL GOVERNMENT WHEN BARRED
When conduct constitutes a federal offense and an offense under local law, a
federal prosecution is a bar to subsequent prosecution by a local government
under either of the following circumstances:
(a) the federal prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction as
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to rectify long-standing problems with judicial application of the
double jeopardy clause in the federal system."
Because the Code is likely to be enacted in the near future, the
problems which inspired sections 707 and 708 and the difficulties which
may occur in the application of those sections should be examined.
I
THE STATUS OF THE LAW
In 1922, in United States v. Lanza,7 the Supreme Court ruled for
the first time that the Constitution's double jeopardy clause was in-
applicable to successive state and federal prosecutions.8 Lanza has been
severely criticized as unsupported by precedent or logic.9 Nevertheless,
thirty-seven years later, in Bartkus v. IllinoisO and Abbate v. United
defined in section 704(a) and (c) or was a barring termination under section
704(d) and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct or arose
from the same criminal episode, unless (i) the statute defining the offense of
which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted is intended to pre-
vent a substantially different harm or evil from the law defining the offense
for which he is subsequently prosecuted, or (ii) the second offense was not
consummated when the first trial began; or
(b) the federal prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final
order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or
vacated and which necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a
fact or a legal proposition which must be established for conviction of the
offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
In this section, "local" has the meaning prescribed in section 707.
6 For a discussion of the history and importance of this clause, see Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 US. 121, 150-64 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the background and purposes of the double jeopardy provisions of
the Proposed Code, see NAiONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEmAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORMNG
PAPERs 331-50 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
7 260 US. 377 (1922).
8 Although this case arose out of unique circumstances under the eighteenth amend-
ment, the Court chose to base its decision on broad principles of dual sovereignty. Id.
at 382.
9 See, e.g., Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309,
1316-29 (1932); Note, Successive Federal and State Trials Arising from the Same Acts, 45
CORNEL. L.Q. 574, 576-77 (1960); Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Govern-
ments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARV. L. Rrv. 1538, 1539-41 (1967); Note,
Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: The Impact of Benton v. Maryland on Successive
Prosecutions for the Same Offense by State and Federal Governments, 46 IND. L.J. 413, 415-
17 (1971); Note, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: A Critical Analysis, 11 Wr. &
MARY L. REv. 946, 950 (1970).
10 359 US. 121 (1959). In Bartkus, the petitioner was acquitted following a federal
prosecution for the robbery of a federally insured bank, and was subsequently convicted
on a virtually identical state indictment for bank robbery. In the federal action it had been
stipulated that the bank was federally insured; therefore, the only issue in each trial was
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States,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lanza principle. The ratio-
nale for these decisions was that because the federal and state govern-
ments are "separate sovereign entities," the judgments and law
enforcement activities of one should not prejudice or hinder the activi-
ties of the other.12 In short, the principles of dual sovereignty and
federalism were considered more significant than the protection
afforded the individual by the double jeopardy clause. Despite con-
tinuing scholarly criticism,13 the dual sovereignty rationale of Bartkus
and Abbate is still law.14
A. Practical Ramifications of Bartkus and Abbate
Since Bartkus and Abbate, several hundred individuals have been
forced to prove their innocence of a specific act twice. Many others
whether Bartkus had in fact perpetrated the act. It was also admitted that federal agents
turned over their evidence to state officials after the federal acquittal. Id. at 122.
11 359 U.S. 187 (1959). In Abbate, petitioners were convicted in an Illinois state court
for conspiring to destroy the property of another. The state prosecution arose out of an
alleged conspiracy to bomb the telephone company. Subsequently, a federal indictment,
alleging identical facts, was handed down. The telephone company was protected under
18 US.C. §§ 371, 1362 (1970), which make it a crime to conspire to destroy or to interfere
with a federally operated or controlled communications system. The second prosecution
resulted in a conviction for the identical conspiracy. This conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court:
tqUndesirable consequences would follow if Lanza were overruled. . . . [I]f the
States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and the resultant
state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal law
enforcement must necessarily be hindered.
359 U.S. at 195.
12 Bartks v. Illinois, 859 U.S. 121, 136-38 (1959); see Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
13 See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. at 580; Note, supra note 9, 80 HARv.
L. REv. at 1589-41, 1564-65; Note, supra note 9, 46 IN. UJ. at 418-22; Note, supra note 9,
11 WM. & MARY L. REv. at 952-59. See also Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50
MINN. L. Rav. 607 (1966); Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy:
Waller and Ashe, 58 CALiF. L. REv. 391, 400-04 (1970). Each of these commentators seeks
to refute the logic and validity of Barthus and Abbate. Justice Black contributed to the
criticism by writing a highly persuasive dissent in Bartkus. Black remarked:
The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the same act is
somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal Government
and the other by a State. Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who
is being prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to grasp. If double punish-
ment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns" to inflict it than for
one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized, that danger is surely no less when
the power of the State and Federal Governments is brought to bear on one man
in two trials, than when one of these "Sovereigns" proceeds alone. In each case,
inescapably, a man is forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.
859 US. at 155.
14 See cases cited in notes 15-16 infra. But see Benton v. Maryland, 895 U.S. 784
(1969) (double jeopardy prohibition "fundamental right!' no state can deny); cf. Ashe v.
Swenson, 897 U.S. 436 (1970) (basic principles of collateral estoppel fundamental to
double jeopardy clause); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (double jeopardy clause
bars successive state and municipal prosecutions).
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have either been punished twice for the same act, or have been con-
victed and punished after acquittal in another jurisdiction. Every
year the Supreme Court denies several petitions for certiorari, relying
upon Bartkus and Abbate;16 every year numerous state and federal
court decisions are based on the rationale of Bartkus and A bbate. 6 For
example, the recent case of United States v. Mechanic'7 involved the
trial of a defendant arrested at a large protest demonstration.18 In a
Washington state court the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to
prove that he had not thrown a firecracker at a policeman. He was
convicted of violating a temporary restraining order in effect at the
time of the protest.19 Subsequently, the defendant was convicted in
federal court for the same act on the theory that throwing the fire-
cracker had also violated the anti-riot provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.20 Citing Abbate, the appellate court allowed the second
prosecution; 21 the Supreme Court denied certiorari.22
The abundance of this type of case is difficult to reconcile with
the traditional Anglo-American abhorrence of double jeopardy.2 3 It is
unfair, embarrassing, and financially onerous to force an individual
to defend himself twice against the same accusation. The possibility of
convicting an innocent man is multiplied when prosecutors are given
a second chance, and thus allowed to remedy tactical errors and weak-
nesses in the first prosecution. Furthermore, successive prosecutions
for the same criminal act are wasteful of already overburdened judi-
cial resources. Yet, in Bartkus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter held these con-
siderations less important than the principle of "federalism":
It would be in derogation of our federal system to displace the re-
15 The following is a list of 1971 denials of certiorari in New Jersey cases alone:
Feldman v. New Jersey, 404 U.S. 865 (1971); Jacks v. New Jersey, 404 US. 865 (1971);
Leuty v. New Jersey, 404 U.S. 865 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 404 U.S.
831 (1971); Bechtel Corp. v. New Jersey, 404 U.S. 821 (1971).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Crossen, 462 F.2d 96, 103 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex re. Hill v. United States,
452 F.2d 664, 665 (5th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Neil, 452 F.2d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1971);
Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624, 628 n.3 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 446
F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638, 639-42 (Pa. 1971); State ex rel. Cullen v. Cici, 45 Wis.
2d 432, 457, 173 N.W.2d 174, 187 (1970).
17 454 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 US. 929 (1972).
18 Id. at 850-51.
19 Id. at 855.
20 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (1970).
21 454 F.2d at 855.
22 406 U.S. 929 (1972).
23 See J. SitLER, DouBL JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SoCIAL POLICY
1-37 (1969). See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting);
Brief for Petitioner at 20-39, Bartkus v. Illinois, supra.
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served power of the States over state offenses by reason of prosecu-
tion of minor federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the
control of the States.
Some recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a
deft device for establishing a centralized government are not only
without factual justification but fly in the face of history.24
Although Frankfurter concluded that "[p]recedent, experience, and
reason alike support[ed] the conclusion that Alfonse Bartkus [had]
not been deprived of due process," 25 Mr. Justice Brennan disagreed,
noting in dissent that the second trial had been dominated by the
same federal officials who had been unable to convict Bartkus in their
first attempt.2
Unfortunately, the problems presented by the Bartkus-Abbate
rationale are becoming more pronounced. First, the federal govern-
ment is steadily expanding its control in the area of criminal law.27
Many crimes traditionally regulated by the states are now subject to
federal jurisdiction. 28 Indeed, many criminal activities, although essen-
tially local in nature, are controlled by the federal government. 29
And yet, in most of these new areas of federal jurisdiction, the tradi-
tional power of the states has not been supplanted. For example, the
states retain authority to prosecute individuals for such crimes as bank
or train robbery, loan sharking, rioting, or conspiracy, even though
the federal government may also prosecute them for these crimes. It
24 359 U.S. at 137.
25 Id. at 139.
26 Id. at 165-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27 .Important new federal programs since 1968 have vastly expanded the role of the
federal government in state law enforcement. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-95 (1970).
Title I of that Act created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which
operates cooperative planning efforts for federal and state law enforcement.
28 In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the Supreme Court demonstrated
the increasingly broad base for federal criminal jurisdiction. In that case, it was held that
the federal government could prosecute loan-sharking activity, even though the activity
was exclusively local and did not extend across state lines. The expressed rationale was
that Congress had found that most loan sharks were under the control of organized crime,
and that organized crime has an interstate impact. Id. at 147. The Perez case borrowed
from Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which had held that the commerce clause
could apply to exclusively local activities-in that case, wheat production-if even a
remote connection to interstate commerce were shown.
In response to increasing crime, Congress has taken hold of the constitutional
opportunities afforded by Perez and Wickard. Federal criminal statutes increasingly over-
lap with crimes traditionally local in nature. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970) (use of
interstate facilities to incite riot); id. § 659 (embezzlement or larceny from carrier); id.
§,2113 (bank robbery).
29 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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is obvious that as the federal government moves into areas of tradi-
tional state control without supplanting state authority, the problem
of successive prosecutions will grow.
A second reason why the double jeopardy problems caused by
Barthus and A b bate are becoming more commonplace is that this is an
age of "co-operative federalism,"30 characterized by extensive coopera-
tion between state and federal law enforcement agencies. 31 When this
cooperation occurs in the context of successive prosecutions, however,
the basic premises of the dual sovereignty rationale are shaken.32 The
justification for allowing successive prosecutions is that the state and
federal governments are separate sovereigns, each entitled to its day in
court. But when such cooperation exists, each jurisdiction clearly does
not enjoy a separate day in court. This is especially true when each
government is using the same evidence to prove the same facts.m
B. Inconsistencies in the Bartkus-Abbate Rationale
The dual sovereignty rationale, relied on in Barthus and Abbate,
has been steadily eroded in all other areas of constitutional law. In
Malloy v. Hogan,3a the Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment was fundamental and therefore extended
to the states by the fourteenth amendment.3 5 Prior to Malloy, the Su-
30 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 US. 52, 56 (1964). In Murphy, it was held
that because of cooperation between federal and state officials the dual sovereignty
theory was outweighed by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. A state
could not grant state immunity and coerce statements which would incriminate under
federal law. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text inIra.
Murphy is often contrasted to Bartkus and Abbate, in which the double jeopardy
clause was outweighed by the dual sovereignty argument. See note 45 infra.
31 Six days after Jartkus, Attorney General Rogers issued a memorandum establishing
a Justice Department policy of avoiding successive prosecutions unless the second prosecu-
tion was important to the interests of the United States. Excerpted in United States v.
Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 855-56 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971). This memorandum recognized and
strongly approved of extensive cooperation between state and federal officials in cases
where crimes overlap. See N.Y. Times, April 6, 1959, at 1, col. 4-5. For a discussion of
cooperation between state and federal officials, see L. MILLEm, DOuBLE JEOPARDY AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 70-73 (1968). See also Swindler, The Chief Justice and Law Reform, 1971
S. Cr. REv. 241, 242; Brief for Petitioner at 72-75, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
82 In Barthus, Mr. Justice Brennan remarked:
- What happened here was simply that the federal effort which failed in the federal
courthouse was renewed a second time in the state courthouse across the street.
Not content with the federal jury's resolution of conflicting testimony in Bartkus'
favor, the federal officers engineered this second prosecution and on the second try
obtained the desired conviction.
359 U.S. at 169.
83 Id. at 166-68.
84 378 US. 1 (1964).
85 Id. at 10-11.
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preme Court had ruled that the federal government could compel a wit-
ness to give testimony which would incriminate him under state law,86
that a state could compel testimony which would incriminate him under
federal law, 7 and that in either case such testimony was admissible in
court.38 The dual sovereignty rationale provided the basis for all these
earlier decisions. On the day that Malloy v. Hogan was decided, how-
ever, the Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,8 overruled
these prior cases, reasoning that if the right against self-incrimination
was fundamental, it necessarily applied between the state and federal
governments. 40 Dual sovereignty could not outweigh a fundamental
right.
Elkins v. United States4' involved the illegal seizure of evidence
by state law enforcement officials. Prior to Elkins, such evidence would
have been admissible in federal court. Under the long accepted "silver
platter" doctrine, evidence illegally seized by state officials could be
used in federal court; the illegal evidence could be handed to federal
prosecutors "on a silver platter."42 But in Elkins the Supreme Court
rejected this doctrine, holding that the fundamental protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures outweighed the dual sovereignty
rationale.
In Benton v. Maryland,43 decided ten years after Bartkus and
Abbate, the Supreme Court ruled that the double jeopardy clause
extends a fundamental right. Since Benton, the Bartkus-Abbate ratio-
nale has come under increasing attack, but has been consistently sus-
tained in state and federal decisions.44 Although there are distinctions
36 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
37 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
38 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
39 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (absent immunity provision, one jurisdiction in federal system
may not compel testimony which might incriminate the defendant in another jurisdiction).
4o Id. at 77-80.
41 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
42 The evidence would be admissible in the second jurisdiction because the officials
of that jurisdiction had not themselves made the illegal seizure. See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweit-
zer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). The rationale of the doctrine was that illegal acts by officials
in one state should not be permitted to prejudice the law enforcement activities of another
jurisdiction. Without the illegal seizure, however, the second jurisdiction probably would
not have had the evidence anyway. This weakness was implicitly recognized in Elkins,
where the doctrine was repudiated.
The rationale of Bartkus-Abbate is similar to that of the "silver platter" cases. Sup-
porters of Barthus-Abbate contend that a trial in one jurisdiction should not be permitted
to prejudice the law enforcement activities of another jurisdiction.
43 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
44 See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
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between Elkins, Murphy, and Bartkus-Ab bate,45 it is clear that the Su-
preme Court views fundamental rights as transcending technical
distinctions of federalism. 4 As Justice Black has pointed out, if a
defendant must undergo successive prosecutions, it makes little differ-
ence to him whether the second prosecution is state, federal, local, or
foreign.47
Some have suggested that the problems presented by Barthus and
A b bate may be solved by the discretionary restraint of state and federal
officials4" or by state legislation.49 The American system, however, does
45 One basic distinction between a Murphy-Elkins situation and a Bartkus-Abbate
situation is that, under Murphy and Elkins, the abandonment of dual sovereignty prind-
ples does not bar the state or federal government from prosecution-only from using
illegal testimony or evidence. In contrast, if Bartkus and Abbate were overruled, there
would be a complete preclusion of the second trial.
Another suggested distinction is that in the Elkins and Murphy situations, one juris-
diction was trying to use the fruits of another jurisdiction's illegal activity, while in Bart-
kus and Abbate, the second jurisdiction was attempting to do nothing more than vindicate
its own interests.
The distinctions between Elkins and Murphy, and Bartkus and Abbate, as well as
the important similarities are discussed in Note, supra note 9, 80 HARV. L. REv. at 1546-49.
46 Elkins and Murphy seem to establish the rule that fundamental constitutional
principles cannot be overridden by dual sovereignty or federalism arguments. It would
follow that in light of .Benton, which held double jeopardy to be a fundamental right,
Elkins and Murphy obliterate the rationale of Bartkus and Abbate. See Schaefer, supra
note 13, at 400-02; Note, supra note 9, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. at 955-58; 39 U. CIN. L.
REv. 799, 802-04 (1970). See generally Note, supra note 9, 80 HARV. L. REv. at 1546-49.
47 Ironically, since 1820, criminal prosecution by another nation has barred prosecu-
tion in federal courts for the same act. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
605, 612 (1820). The curious contradiction between this case and Abbate is discussed in
J. SIGL.R, supra note 23, at 56: "American Courts will not try him if he has been tried by
courts of another nation. One may ask: 'If American courts can trust foreign courts, is it too
much to expect them to trust each other?"' See also Franck, An International Lawyer
Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1096, 1103 (1959).
48 See notes 91-103 and accompanying text infra.
49 About one-third of the states have enacted legislation barring their courts from
prosecution subsequent to federal prosecution for the same act. Perhaps the most sophisti-
cated example is Article 40 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, which explicitly
prohibits New York state courts from trying an individual subsequent to trial for the
same act in another jurisdiction, unless the trial in the other jurisdiction is dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence with respect to an element of the first crime which is not an
element in the second crime. N.Y. CiuM. PRoc. LAw §§ 40.10-.40 (McKinney 1971). For a
comparison of the New York rule and federal double jeopardy standards, see Note, Double
Jeopardy Provisions of the New York Criminal Procedure Law: Variations on a Federal
Theme, 38 BRooFL'r L. REv. 748 (1972).
Of course, the most basic argument offered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bartkus was
that states should be free to operate their own criminal justice system. 359 U.S. at 137.
Nonetheless, it begs the question to say that this issue should be resolved individually by
the states. The states have always been free to limit successive prosecutions, but most do
not. And the problem of successive prosecutions is growing. Furthermore, if the protection
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not normally make fundamental rights dependent upon the discretion
of prosecutors and state legislators. Furthermore, inconsistencies can
result in states with statutes protecting citizens against successive inter-
jurisdictional prosecution. If, for example, an individual charged with
robbing a New York bank is first prosecuted by the federal govern-
ment,50 a provision of the New York Criminal Procedure Law bars a
subsequent state prosecution for the same robbery.51 But if the defen-
dant is unfortunate enough to be prosecuted first by New York, the
federal government may initiate a second prosecution under Abbate.
In many cases, the rights of the accused will thus hinge upon the
fortuity of which jurisdiction prosecuted first.52
Under Barthus and Abbate a defendant has no reasonable way of
knowing whether he will be forced to defend himself against the same
charge twice. To prevent such oppression, the Founding Fathers in-
cluded the double jeopardy clause in the Constitution.53
Finally, it has been suggested that despite its apparent violation
of the double jeopardy clause, the Bartkus-Abbate rationale retains
validity because of the exigencies of civil rights prosecutions.54 In
against double jeopardy is a fundamental right, it can hardly be maintained that the
states should be free to violate that right.
50 The robbery of a federally insured bank is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
51 N.Y. CRIM. PRoC. LAw § 40.20(2) (McKinney 1971).
52 The Attorney General of the United States will often refrain from a second
prosecution in the interests of justice. Six days after Bartkus and Abbate, Attorney
General Rogers issued a memorandum establishing a Justice Department policy of avoid-
ing successive prosecutions unless such prosecution is important to the interests of the
United States: "After a state prosecution there should be no federal trial for the same act
or acts unless the reasons are compelling .... [T]he mere existence of a power, of course,
does not mean that it should necessarily be exercised." Quoted in N.Y. Times, April 6,
1959, at 1, col. 4-5. The great number of subsequent federal prosecutions reflects the lack of
feasible standards in the memorandum. Indeed, it appears that the Justice Department
has on a few occasions ignored the memorandum aind initiated a second prosecution when
no apparent interest of the United States was involved. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanic,
454 F.2d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 1971). But cf. 5 U.S. Comar'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, 1961 REPORT:
JusTIcE 58:
The Civil Rights Division follows an invariable policy of delaying prosecution in
deference to State action. In certain respects this policy appears proper. It leaves the
prime responsibility exactly where it belongs--with the States. But in most of
these cases the Division does more than delay prosecution. It delays the investiga-
tion-provided it is convinced that the State is acting in good faith.
53 For a discussion of the history of the enactment of the double jeopardy clause and
the considerations of the Founding Fathers, see J. SIoLR, supra note 23, at 27-34.
54 The Commission on Civil Rights makes it clear that the federal government
believes that successive state and federal civil rights prosecutions may often be necessary
for the effective vindication of civil rights policies. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL Rsosrrs, supra
note 52, at 208-10 & nn.121-22. It is argued, for example, that "if the State prosecution
results in the imposition of what appear to be inadequate penalties, the Division may
prosecute too." Id. at 209 n.121.
For brief discussions of the civil rights implications of Bartkus-Abbate, see Amster-
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Screws v. United States,55 United States v. Guest,56 and United States v.
Barnhart,57 state juries granted questionable acquittals for heinous
crimes against black citizens and civil rights workers. In the absence of
Abbate, subsequent federal civil rights prosecutions would have been
barred.
This "civil rights" justification for Abbate is of doubtful validity.58
Dissenting in Screws, Justice Frankfurter remarked:
We are told local authorities cannot be relied upon for
courageous and prompt action, that often they have personal or
political reasons for refusing to prosecute. If it be significantly
dam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal
and Habeas Corpus jurisdiction To Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965);
Comment, Successive State and Federal Prosecutions for the Same Offense: Bartkus v.
Illinois Revisited, 62 J. CiaM. L.C. & P.S. 29, 33-34 (1971); Note, supra note 9, 80 HAsv. L.
REV,. at 1552-54.
55 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
56 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In Guest, the defendant murdered a black man but was
acquitted by a local jury. It is widely believed that the acquittal resulted from local anti-
Negro bias. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1970) for conspiring to deprive the victim of his constitutional rights. The conviction
was affirmed. It is recognized that any assault on Bartkus-Abbate must propose a solution
to this type of recurrent problem.
57 22 F. 285, 289 (C.D. Ore. 1884). This was one of the earliest cases upholding
successive prosecutions. The court was concerned with local prejudice against the victim
of the crime-an Indian.
58 If the state trial is truly a sham, it might be argued that the defendant was never
really in jeopardy. See Note, supra note 9, 80 HARV. L. Rlv, at 1551-52. Furthermore, some
have argued that if the state and federal laws have widely variant policies behind them,
double prosecution is permissible. Id. at 1559-64. To the extent clearly separate policies are
involved, double jeopardy might not attach between the offenses involved in a single
act, such as selling liquor to a minor on Sunday. N.Y. CRIm. PROC. LAw § 40.20(2)(f)
(McKinney 1971) bars a state prosecution subsequent to federal prosecution for the same
act, but § 40.20(2)(b) allows subsequent prosecution in cases where the statutes involved
have at least one different element, and the statutes are designed to "prevent very different
kinds of harm or evil."
This New York statute borrows from the Model Penal Code which bars successive
prosecutions between jurisdictions unless the statutes are "intended to prevent a substan-
tially different harm or evil." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10(l)(a) (1962).
In a case such as Guest, the federal government might argue that 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1970) is intended to protect civil rights, while the state murder statute is designed to
prevent murder within the state. However, this argument can be made in almost any case
in which a state and federal statute overlap. The weakness of such an argument is seen
by comparing Guest with the "selling liquor to a minor on Sunday" hypothetical. In the
liquor case, two trials would take place. In one, the only issue would be the age of the
purchaser. The day of the week would be irrelevant. In the other, the age of the purchaser
would be irrelevant. Clearly, both trials are permissible. In Guest, however, the only real
issue in each trial was the murder of the victim. It is difficult to argue that, on the facts
of the case, the interests involved are sufficiently different to require separate trials.
The problem of Guest cannot adequately be met by a different interest approach.
Therefore, if Abbate is rejected and successive prosecutions barred, the problems of civil
rights enforcement must be solved in another way.
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true that crimes against local law cannot be locally prosecuted,
it is an ominous sign indeed. In any event, the cure is a re-invigora-
tion of State responsibility. It is not an undue incursion of remote
federal authority into local duties with consequent debilitation of
local responsibility.59
Naturally, some federal "incursion" will be necessary to effectuate the
policies of civil rights legislation, but this is no justification for viti-
ating the double jeopardy clause. Rather, a system must be developed
which prohibits violations of the double jeopardy clause and at the
same time permits the vindication of civil rights violations.60
II
THE IMPACT OF SECTIONS 707 AND 708 OF THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
Although several scholars have articulated proposals to alleviate
the problems caused by the Bartkus-Abbate rationale,'1 none have yet
been implemented by either the federal legislature or the judiciary.62
The most detailed and intensive approach to the problem of inter-
jurisdictional double jeopardy has been offered by the drafters of the
Proposed Code.68 Section 707 of the Code provides that a federal
prosecution is barred subsequent to prosecution for the same crim-
inal act or transaction in another jurisdiction unless the Attorney
59 325 U.S. at 160-61 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60 For a proposal which hopefully accomplishes this goal, see Appendix and notes
109-13 and accompanying text infra.
61 The most widely discussed proposal was suggested by Walter T. Fisher, appointed
counsel for Bartkus. In his article, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REV. 607
(1966), Fisher proffered a unique and interesting proposal. He began by arguing that a
defendant should be permitted to choose his own forum--state or federal-and that the
resulting prosecution should constitute a bar to action by other jurisdictions. Id. at 610-11.
This proposal alone would be inadequate because it would allow defendants such as
Screws and Guest to select a prejudiced local forum and to evade punishment. But Fisher
also noted that under his plan the federal government would have the option to preempt
the state proceeding. Id. at 610-12.
Fisher's argument appears to break down, however, when he argues that a state
prosecution would not constitute a bar to a subsequent federal prosecution on "federal
issues." Id. at 611. In other words, Fisher would reject Bartkus, barring subsequent state
trials, but not Abbate, barring subsequent federal trials. Such a result is unsatisfactory. As
Justice Black reasoned in Bartkus, if an individual is forced to defend himself twice for
the same act, the burden is no less great merely because different sovereigns bring the
prosecutions. 359 U.S. at 155.
62 Several states have established limitations on their own ability to prosecute subse-
quent to a federal prosecution for the same act or criminal transaction. See note 49 supra.
63 See notes 2-6 and accompanying text supra.
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General of the United States "certifies that the interests of the United
States would be unduly harmed if the federal prosecution [were]
barred."" Section 708 of the Code provides that a state or local govern-
ment is barred from prosecution subsequent to a federal prosecution
for the same act or transaction.65 The Code does not, however, provide
or suggest any mechanism for choice of forum in cases of concurrent
criminal jurisdiction. An examination of sections 707 and 708 reveals
that the problems created by Bartkus-Abbate cannot be solved with-
out such a mechanism.
A. Section 708: Bar to Subsequent State Prosecution
The drafting of section 708 of the Code, which acts as a bar to
state prosecution subsequent to federal prosecution for the same act,
was not accomplished without some difficulty. The official comment to
section 708 notes:
A substantial body of opinion in the Commission, while not
in disagreement with the end to be achieved, favors deletion of this
section, both because of strong doubts as to its constitutionality
and because of the view that, even if constitutional, it would be
preferable, as a matter of comity within the federal system to
permit the states to deal with the problem themselves rather than
to force this result by Congressional action.8
The Study Draft of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,67 issued a
year before the Final Report, provided that the state would be barred
from subsequent action unless the Attorney General of the United
States certified "that the interests of the state would be unduly harmed
if the state prosecution is barred."68 The Working Papers, released be-
fore section 708 was made absolute against the states,69 reveal that
Bartkus and Abbate were responsible for much of the controversy and
confusion surrounding section 708:
A ... difficult question is presented as to whether all State
prosecutions should be barred or whether, as is the case with suc-
cessive Federal prosecutions, there should be provision for succes-
sive prosecutions in limited circumstances. If the Abbate and
Bartkus decisions are not accurate statements of the constitutional
64 For the entire text of § 707, see note 5 supra.
65 For the entire text of § 708, see note 5 supra. It should be noted that under
certain exceptional circumstances the effect of § 708 may be avoided. See, e.g., PROPOSED
CODE § 709. Such exceptions are outside the scope of this Note.
66 PROPOSED CODE § 708, Official Comment at 64.
67 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, STUY DRrr (1970).
68 Id. § 707. This section became PROPOSED CODE § 708.
69 The Working Papers, consisting of materials used by the Commission, were issued
on July 1, 1970.
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doctrine of double jeopardy, then, of course, there can be no
successive prosecutions in any circumstances. While the draft takes
the position that those decisions are unsound, it accepts their
doctrinal validity .... 70
Even if Barthus and Abbate are conceded doctrinal validity, they
delineate only the minimum limitations placed on government by the
double jeopardy clause. There is no apparent reason why Congress
cannot go beyond Bartkus and Abbate and expand double jeopardy
protections. Fortunately, equivocation ceased and an absolute bar was
placed on the states by section 708 in the Final Report.
The history of section 708 reveals a broad controversy surrounding
its constitutionality. Both commentators and legislators feared that
section 708 would infringe upon the traditional areas of police power
reserved to the states by the tenth amendmentY1 This argument was
articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Bartkus.7 2 But while the Bartkus
opinion tended to preserve the police powers of the states, it did not
insulate the states from valid federal legislation. Normally, when the
federal government desires to exercise its powers under the supremacy
clause and to exclude the states from an area, it will simply preempt
the entire area.73 But no one would seriously suggest that the federal
70 WORKING PAPERs 349.
71 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 931-34 (statement of A. Miller, Attorney General of
Virginia); id. at 1024-25 (statement of R. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida); id. at 1168-
76 (statement of R. Israel, Attorney General of Rhode Island).
72 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1959).
73 Under the supremacy clause, when Congress has authority to legislate in a specific
area, it has correlative power to prevent the states from interfering with its legislation.
The propriety of excluding states from interference in areas of federal authority was
established in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall re-
marked that "the acts of New York must yield to the law of congress." Id. at 210.
Therefore, assuming the validity of most federal criminal laws, it would appear that
§ 708 is a fortiori valid under the supremacy clause.
In California v. Zook, 386 U.S. 725 (1949), the Supreme Court stated:
There is no longer any question that Congress can redefine the areas of local
and national predominance . . . despite theoretical inconsistency with the
rationale of the Commerce Clause as a limitation in its own right. . . . When
Congress enters the field by legislation, we try to discover to what extent it in-
tended to exercise its power of redefinition.
Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
Other cases have reaffirmed the principle that state police power may be preempted
by the federal government. In Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963), the Court
stated:
In areas of the law not inherently requiring national uniformity, our decisions are
clear in requiring that state statutes, otherwise valid, must be upheld unless there
is found "such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both
cannot stand in the same area, [or] evidence of a congressional design to preempt
the field."
Id. at 430 (emphasis added), quoting Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
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government should preempt states from criminal prosecution in all
areas which involve the federal government. State criminal jurisdiction
is too ingrained in our federal system. Therefore, federal criminal pre-
emption must be selective and the state should be preempted only
if the federal government prosecuted first.74 Pennsylvania v. Nelson,7 5
cited by the drafters of the Code,76 held the Pennsylvania Sedition
Act77 unconstitutional on the ground that federal sedition laws "oc-
cupied the field."78 The Court pointed out that it was "not unmindful
of the risk of compounding punishments which would be created by
finding concurrent state power.... Without compelling indication to
the contrary, we will not assume that Congress intended to permit the
possibility of double punishment."79 Under section 708 there would be
no doubt about congressional intent; there is a specific manifestation
of intent that double punishment should not be permitted. In
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,80 the Court specifically stated that
the supremacy clause allowed the federal government to grant im-
munity from state prosecution.8 ' It is a contradiction in terms to main-
tain that immunity can be granted but that prosecution may not be
barred.
The fourteenth amendment provides an additional constitutional
basis for section 708. In Benton v. Maryland,8 2 the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment was held to incorporate the double jeop-
(1963). Section 708 would dearly be "evidence of a congressional design to preempt the
field." In all cases in which criminal jurisdiction is concurrent, and in which the federal
government prosecuted first, the states would be preempted.
74 Such selective preemption is not without precedent. In Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 71 (1964), the Supreme Court remarked that "the Federal Govern-
ment could, under the Supremacy Clause, grant immunity from state prosecution." Several
federal statutes, all of which have been held constitutional, demonstrate that selective
preemption of state power to prosecute is permissible. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970)
(carrier embezzlement statute): "[N]or shall any provision of this section be construed as
invalidating any provision of State Law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of
the purposes of this section or any provision thereof." Several of these statutes also include
provisions which bar federal prosecution subsequent to state prosecution for the same act.
See, e.g., id.
75 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
76 The drafters dted the case as support for the constitutionality of § 708. WoaKING
PAPERs 349. Critics have contended that the case was misconstrued. See Hearings, supra
note 4, at 1168-68, 1175 (statement of R. Israel, Attorney General of Rhode Island).
77 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (1963).
78 850 U.S. at 500. The relevant federal statute was the Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385 (1970).
79 850 U.S. at 509-10.
80 878 U.S. 52 (1964).
81 Id. at 71.
82 895 U.S. at 784, 795-96 (1969).
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ardy clause. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowers Con-
gress to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.83 In
light of Benton, section 5 gives Congress the power to prohibit any
action which it reasonably considers violative of the double jeopardy
clause. For Congress to decide that successive federal and state prosecu-
tions violate the double jeopardy clause would not seem to be an un-
reasonable exercise of this authority.84
Concern over the constitutionality of section 708 thus would ap-
pear unfounded. The remaining question is whether section 708 is
workable. In recent Senate hearings on the Code, several critics of
section 708 complained that enactment of the section would cause
"races to the courthouse."8' 5 As they now stand, sections 707 and 708
perhaps may cause such races, but the underlying cause of this behavior
would not be the bar in section 708. The real problem is that the Code
fails to provide a means for determining whether a defendant should
be tried by the state or the federal government.86 It makes little sense
to assert that in order to prevent races to the courthouse we should
83 In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 US. 641 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that
§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment afforded Congress broad power to enforce the substantive
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. The Court noted:
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the
enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a
condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both
congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing
the Amendment.
Id. at 648 (emphasis added). The Court continued: "By including § 5 the draftsmen
sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause .... Id. at
650 (emphasis added).
84 This is especially true in light of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), which held
that basic notions of collateral estoppel are implicit in the double jeopardy clause. Al-
though Ashe v. Swenson did not arise in an interjurisdictional context, the crux of the
case is that it is unconstitutional to force an individual to defend himself twice against
the same factual allegation. If a defendants alibi is that he was in Paris on the day of
the crime, he should only be forced to prove once that he was in Paris. The burdens
remedied by Ashe are no less severe when the separate trials ocur in separate forums.
Although collateral estoppel has been suggested as a possible solution to the Barthus-
Abbate problem, such a theory creates new problems. First, it is basic to collateral
estoppel that a party not privy to the first action cannot be estopped by the results of
that action. Of course, in cases where there is extensive state and federal cooperation, it
can reasonably be argued that privity exists. Second, it is also basic to collateral estoppel
that only those issues which were specifically decided can work an estoppel. In most
criminal cases, a general verdict is rendered. It is usually impossible to delineate exactly
what the jury decided on particular issues.
85 Hearings, supra note 4, at 931 (statement of A. Miller, Attorney General of Vir-
ginia).
86 See notes 105-07 and accompanying text inIra.
[Vol. 58:734
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
abandon the fundamental right against being placed in double jeop-
ardy. Races to the courthouses may be eliminated in other ways.1t
Criticism of section 708 has also dealt with the potential hostility
which it might engender between federal and state prosecutors. 8 It has
been pointed out that
Sections 201 and 207 would not have the impact on Federal-
State relations which they do were it not for Section 708 which is
revolutionary criminal law....
The practical effect of Section 708 would be to make the State
a non-appearing party, bound by adjudications which it has no
opportunity to argue or oppose .... 89
There are major weaknesses in this argument. The states would have
an opportunity to vindicate their interests by cooperating with federal
authorities, participating in the investigation, and generally assisting
at all levels. Furthermore, in cases where the state interest is clearly
superior, the state could prevail upon the federal prosecutor to decline
jurisdiction and to allow state prosecution. Undoubtedly, prosecutors
could adapt to section 708, realizing that in cases of concurrent juris-
diction they must cooperate and present their case against the defen-
dant in a single trial.
State prosecutors would not relish being deprived of their power
to prosecute certain cases; however, the Bill of Rights was not designed
to optimize prosecutorial efficiency. Therefore, even if it does cause
some abrasion between state and federal prosecutors, section 708 is
justifiable insofar as it prevents double jeopardy. Although there is a
tension here between basic concepts of federalism and basic concepts
of double jeopardy, the protection against double jeopardy must not
be vitiated for the sake of federalism. Rather, productive federal-state
cooperation must be encouraged in order to vindicate all interests in
one trial.90
87 See notes 108-13 and accompanying text infra.
88 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 1168-76 (statement of R. Israel, Attorney General of
Rhode Island).
89 Id. at 1175.
00 It has been suggested that if subsequent state prosecutions are barred, a defendant
might go free if his federal prosecution resulted in acquittal or dismissal because of an
exclusively federal element of the crime. For example, if an individual were charged with
the federal crime of crossing state lines to commit a riot, and the federal government
were unable to prove that he crossed state lines, would the state be barred from prosecu-
tion for the simple state crime of rioting? Section 708(b) of the Code resolves this
dilemma. Under this section a state prosecution is barred only if the federal action was
terminated by an acquittal or dismissal which "necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition which must be established for conviction of
the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted." The fact that a defendant
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Section 708 should be adopted. As the Code recognizes, the time
has come to effectuate the most meaningful interpretation of the double
jeopardy clause-no person should be compelled to prove twice that
he did not do "X," regardless of how many jurisdictions happen to
designate "X" a crime.
B. Section 707: Limited Bar to Federal Prosecution
Section 707 of the Code bars a federal prosecution subsequent to
a state prosecution unless the Attorney General of the United States
certifies that the bar would unduly harm the interests of the United
States. This policy is not new-it merely codifies Justice Depart-
ment procedure which has been informally followed since 1959.91
Nevertheless, the problems of multiple interjurisdictional prosecution
continue to increase. 92 Section 707 is inadequate in its present form for
three basic reasons.
First, even if the Bartkus-Abbate rationale is accepted, section 707
offers the Attorney General no meaningful standard by which to deter-
did not cross state lines is not inconsistent with the fact of rioting and therefore the
state, properly, would be free to proceed. Naturally, this exception to the general principle
is only available when it is manifestly dear that the dismissal or acquittal in the federal
action resulted from insufficiency of proof of an exclusively federal element of the crime.
The New York Criminal Procedure Law deals with this problem far more clearly
than the Proposed Code:
2. A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon
the same act or criminal transaction unless:
(f) One of the offenses consists of a violation of a statutory provision of
another jurisdiction, which offense has been prosecuted in such other jurisdiction
and has there been terminated by a court order expressly founded upon insuffi-
ciency of evidence to establish some element of such offense which is not an
element of the other offense, defined by the laws of this state.
N.Y. ChUM. PRoC. LAW § 40.20(2)(f) (McKinney 1971) (emphasis added). If a prosecution for
bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970) is dismissed on the ground that the bank in
question is not federally insured, the state is not barred since federal insurance is not an
element of the state crime.
91 The policy of avoiding successive prosecutions except in cases of great national
importance was explained in a memorandum from Attorney General Rogers. See N.Y.
Times, April 6, 1959, at 1, col. 4-5. Several deviations have been made. See, e.g., United States
v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 855 (1971). In this case, the Justice Department ignored the
memorandum policy and initiated a second prosecution without any claim of national
importance. The court held that the memorandum was not legally binding, and that the
federal government could initiate a second prosecution without qualification because of
Bartkus and Abbate. It should be noted, however, that it would have been manifestly
simple for the Justice Department to claim that the case was important to the interests of
the United States.
The policy has been closely adhered to in civil rights cases, however. See U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 58, 208-09.
92 See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
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mine when a second prosecution is appropriate. A subsequent federal
prosecution is authorized whenever a bar would "unduly harm" the
United States. This is a hopelessly vague index.
Section 207 of the Code does provide for discretionary restraint
in the exercise of concurrent federal jurisdiction, listing several factors
which may influence the Attorney General to decline federal jurisdic-
tion.93 Arguably, this section sets adequate standards for when to re-
prosecute under section 707. However, even if the section 207 standards
are extended to section 707, no justifiable basis exists for section 707's
allowance of successive prosecutions for the same act.
Moreover, by clothing inadequately guided discretion with ap-
proval, Congress would in effect sanction violation of the double jeop-
ardy clause. At least today, the Attorney General tends to be cautious
in deciding whether to initiate second prosecutions for the same act.94
But under the Code, the issue of fairness in reprosecution is non-
existent.9 5 Section 707 alludes only to the interests of the United States;
the rights of the accused are not mentioned. Thus, even the status quo
is preferable to section 707. Both leave much to be desired.
Second, significant constitutional questions are raised by the dis-
cretionary clause of section 707. The Supreme Court has left little
doubt that only a "compelling governmental interest" can justify the
93 Although § 207 authorizes federal law enforcement officials to decline jurisdiction
over crimes when concurrent jurisdiction exists between the federal government and a
state, federal officials may exercise this option only in the absence of a "substantial Federal
interest." Section 207 defines "substantial Federal interest" to include cases in which
(a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is impeded by
interstate aspects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is believed to be necessary to
vindicate federally-protected civil rights; (c) if federal jurisdiction exists under
section 201(b), the offense is closely related to the underlying offense, as to which
there is a substantial federal interest; (d) an offense apparently limited in its
impact is believed to be associated with organized criminal activities extending
beyond state lines; (e) state or local law enforcement has been so corrupted as to
undermine its effectiveness substantially.
Although § 207 says nothing about a bar to state prosecution (indeed, § 206 says that
the existence of federal jurisdiction does not bar the state), it might be argued that the
list of federal interests in § 207 is also useful for exercising retrial discretion under
§ 707. Even if this interpretation is accepted, however, § 707 remains unacceptable for
reasons discussed in notes 94-103 and accompanying text infra.
94 In the memorandum of April 6, 1959, the Attorney General remarked:
After a state prosecution there should be no federal trial for the same act or acts
unless the reasons are compelling.... [T]hose of us charged with law enforce-
ment responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and with self-restraint in
this area.
Quoted in United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 856 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971).
95 Even § 207, in its list of important considerations, never mentions the factor of
fairness to the defendant. See note 93 supra.
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infringement of a fundamental right.96 Section 707 allows successive
prosecutions without any showing of compelling interests. Further-
more, if federal interests in a particular case were truly compelling,
the federal government could preempt the state proceedings, 97 allowing
vindication of federal interests without violation of the double jeopardy
clause. Section 707 cannot meet the compelling interest test because
it relies on a discretionary determination by the federal prosecutor
that federal interests may be "unduly harmed" by a bar-surely an
inadequate standard for determining compelling interests.
If section 707 is enacted into law and the Attorney General initi-
ates second prosecutions only rarely, the de facto result is clearly
unconstitutional. Under such circumstances, defendants will generally
not expect a second trial. They would be unfairly surprised when the
second trial was initiated. In Furman v. Georgia,98 the majority of
Justices seemed to agree on only one thing: when a law or policy strikes
"like lightning," 99 because it is discretionary and erratically applied,
it is unconstitutional. 100 It is hardly an exceptional proposition that
discretionary and unpredictable laws or policies do not meet due pro-
cess standards. 10 1 Therefore, even if successive prosecutions under
section 707 occur only rarely, the result is unconstitutional under both
the double jeopardy and the due process clauses. If the Attorney
General frequently initiates second prosecutions, the incidence of
double jeopardy violations increases. Regardless of how the Attorney
General interprets his rights under section 707, the problems of
Bartkus and Abbate remain.
Third, inconsistencies would result from the difference between
sections 707 and 708. If a defendant were tried first in federal court,
96 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court established that the
double jeopardy clause is fundamental. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. It
follows that a compelling interest should be required for a state or the federal government
(or both acting together) to override that clause.
97 The constitutionality of such preemption has already been established. See notes
72-84 and accompanying text supra. Preemption is also at the crux of the proposal made
herein. See Appendix.
98 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
99 Id. at 809 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100 It is recognized that Furman is of limited precedential value because of the nature
of the case and the diversity of opinions. Nevertheless, to the extent that anything is
agreed upon by the majority, it is that a law or policy is unconstitutional if there is no
rational or discernible standard of application. Justice Douglas noted that legislatures
must "write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and . . .
require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spot-
tily to unpopular groups." Id. at 256.
101 See generally id.
[Vol. 58:734
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
subsequent state prosecution would be barred by section 708. But if
he were tried first in state court, the defendant could fall victim to
double prosecution under section 707.102
These problems could be eliminated by deleting the discretionary
clause from section 707, thus making a state prosecution a bar to a
subsequent federal prosecution. The most troubling argument against
such a deletion is that it would hamper the federal government in its
efforts to vindicate important federal interests, such as enforcing civil
rights legislation.10 3 To the extent that federal interests would be
harmed by a bar to successive prosecutions, a system should be
developed which not only allows federal prosecution, but also protects
the double jeopardy rights of the accused, and yet does not preempt the
police power of the states unless federal interests demand it.
C. The Need for an Integrated System for Choice of Forum Under
the Code in Cases of Concurrent State and Federal Criminal Juris-
diction
If double jeopardy violations are to be avoided in cases of over-
lapping federal and state criminal jurisdiction, a mechanism must be
developed for choice of forum. The Code fails to provide any method
of determining which forum should prosecute the defendant. In part,
of course, this failure results from the Code's willingness to allow
successive prosecutions, at least in a state-federal chronology.
The choice of forum issue is indirectly considered in the Code:
[F]ederal law enforcement agencies are authorized to decline or
discontinue federal enforcement efforts whenever the offense can
effectively be prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it appears
that there is no substantial Federal interest in further prosecution
or that the offense primarily affects state, local or foreign inter-
ests.104
In short, in all cases where jurisdiction is concurrent, federal authori-
ties may decline jurisdiction. When federal jurisdiction is declined,
the state will proceed and there will be no choice of forum problem.
However, nothing in the Code provides that the federal government's
decision to take jurisdiction bars a state prosecution. Section 708 bars
state prosecution only when there has been a full attachment of jeop-
ardy in federal court.105 Section 207 gives federal authorities discre-
102 Cf. notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
103 See notes 54-60 and accompanying text supra.
104 PROPOSED CODE § 207.
105 Section 704 of the Code, entitled "When Prosecution Barred by Former Prosecu-
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tion to decline jurisdiction, but it does not give them discretion to bar
or preempt state prosecution. No matter what decision federal authori-
ties make under section 207, the state is completely free to proceed,
subject only to section 708 limitations.16 Therefore, it is clear that
section 207 does not afford an adequate mechanism for choice of
forum in cases of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction. If a state
government initiates prosecution against a defendant, the federal
government may either decline jurisdiction under section 207, or it
may initiate its own second prosecution. Even if jeopardy has attached
in state court, the discretionary clause of section 707 would allow
a subsequent federal prosecution. But the federal government is given
no method of preventing the state prosecution.107
Modification of the Code is necessary to integrate sections 207,
707, and 708 and to provide a mechanism for assumption of juris-
diction by the forum which could most appropriately dispose of the
case. 08
The proposal advocated herein' 09-selective preemption-provides
tion for Same Offense," is a rather standard codification of circumstances under which
jeopardy attaches.
106 The exercise of discretion is vested with finality by section 207, which states
that "[tihe presence or absence of a federal interest and any other question relat-
ing to the exercise of the discretion referred to in this section are for the prose-
cuting authorities alone and are not litigable." The door is finally bolted shut to
state authorities by section 708 which bars in most instances state prosecution
"based on the same conduct or [arising] from the same criminal episode" after
federal prosecution. In short, once the federal prosecutor decides to step in, the
state authorities are, in effect, out of the ball game.
Dobbyn, A Proposal for Changing the Jurisdictional Provisions of the New Federal
Criminal Code, 57 CoRNLL L. REv. 198, 202-03 (1972) (emphasis added). It is difficult to
perceive how such a conclusion can be reached. Nowhere in the Code is it even implied
that the mere assumption of jurisdiction by the federal prosecutor is a bar to state
prosecution. Indeed, § 206 unequivocally contradicts Dobbyn: "The existence of federal
jurisdiction over an offense shall not, in itself, prevent any state or local government
from exercising jurisdiction .... " The assumption of federal jurisdiction is not a bar to
the states. The only bar to the states found, in the Code is § 708, which takes effect not
when federal jurisdiction is assumed pursuant to § 207 but rather when full jeopardy
attaches pursuant to § 708. The distinction is crucial, because if the mere assumption of
jurisdiction were a bar to the states, the result would be a full-fledged preemption
statute. See notes 109-13 and accompanying text infra. Section 207 is not such a statute. It
provides no basis for federal preemption. Rather, it merely affords the federal prosecutor
an option to decline federal jurisdiction.
107 See note 106 supra.
108 One possibility would be to allow the defendant to choose his own forum. This
would be inadequate, however, since it would allow the beneficiary of local prejudice to
choose a local forum and to thwart important federal policies. Certainly, the defendants in
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1943), and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966),
would have chosen trials in the local community.
109 See Appendix.
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that the ultimate decision as to proper forum must be made by the
federal government. The only alternatives are to leave choice of forum
to the states, to the individual, or to chance. Each alternative presents
serious difficulties, and, in balance, federal choice is clearly superior. 10
In cases in which the state initiates its prosecution first, but in which
the federal government desires to vindicate important federal interests,
the Attorney General could preempt the state action by certifying that
federal interests so require. The Attorney General could be guided in
his decision to preempt by the standards set out in section 207.11 Al-
though these standards are admittedly inadequate for the purpose of
granting a second prosecution in violation of the double jeopardy
clause, they are not inappropriate for determining which forum should
dispose of the case.
If the federal government decides to prosecute, the only recourse
open to the state is cooperation in the federal prosecution. Through
this cooperation, the state can ensure that the one trial vindicates not
only federal but also state interests. In many cases, the state might
sincerely believe that its own interests require exercise of the state
police power. Certainly, state officials may attempt to persuade federal
officials that the case is more appropriate for state action and that under
section 207 federal jurisdiction should be declined. Indeed, because
of the congestion of federal courts, federal officials should be predis-
posed to permit the states to bring their own action in the absence of
compelling federal interests. There will be cases in which the state will
feel that its interests have been derogated by federal preemption. In
such cases, however, federal preemption will have resulted from the
Attorney General's belief that important national interests outweigh
the state's interest. Either the federal government or the state must
be barred from action; the alternative is to sacrifice the rights of the
individual under the double jeopardy clause. The selective preemption
formulation recognizes the concepts of federalism but also protects
the individual's fifth amendment rights.
Under both selective preemption and section 707, the Attorney
General has discretion to prosecute in cases of concurrent jurisdiction.
But under selective preemption, he must decide to prosecute before
110 The difficulties in leaving choice of forum to coincidence have been explored. See
notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra. So, too, serious difficulties arise if we leave
choice of forum to the states, particularly in the field of civil rights. See notes 54-60 and
accompanying text supra.
The only practical alternative, in fact, is to leave the choice to the federal government.
This is consistent with the supremacy clause. Also, it assures that national civil rights
policies are vindicated without subjecting the defendant to two trials for the same act.
Ill See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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jeopardy attaches in the state court.112 Failure to do so will result in a
bar. The goal of both section 707 and selective preemption is to allow
the Attorney General to prosecute whenever important national
interests are at stake. Section 707 attains this goal at the expense of the
defendant's rights under the double jeopardy clause. Selective preemp-
tion would not require such a sacrifice: when national interests so re-
quire, the Attorney General preempts; when they do not, the state may
proceed.118
CONCLUSION
The Proposed Federal Criminal Code consciously attempts to deal
with the problems created by Bartkus and Abbate. It fails, not only
because of the discretionary nature of section 707, but also because
of the corresponding absence of guidelines and mechanisms for forum
choice in cases of concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Selective preemp-
tion offers a viable alternative to the haphazard Code provisions rela-
ting to interjurisdictional double jeopardy.
112 Jeopardy usually attaches in state proceedings either when the jury is sworn in, or
when the first witness is sworn in. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 410 F.2d 259 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Fonesca v. Judges, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Generally,
jeopardy does not attach until several months after the accusatory instrument is filed. The
time delay results from clogged calendars, grand jury hearings, pretrial motions and
hearings, and jury selection. Therefore, the federal government will usually have a
reasonable time to decide if federal jurisdiction would be more appropriate.
Of course, in cases where the defendant colludes with friendly local officials to procure
a speedy and secret acquittal in order to avoid federal jurisdiction, § 709 of the Code
would permit federal prosecution. This exception to the general bar of § 707 is available
only in dear cases of collusion to avoid federal prosecution.
113 A possible flaw in the preemption plan might become evident when local prejudice
exists but the federal crime carries a significantly less severe penalty than the state crime.
The state would argue that it could give a fair trial, and that its interest in prosecution
would be greater than the federal interest, as evidenced by the more stringent penalty.
Such an argument should be seriously considered by federal authorities. However, if the
federal government believes that a federal trial would be more appropriate in the case,
preemption would not be unreasonable. Again, the alternative is to subject the defendant
to double jeopardy. Furthermore, this type of problem would be uncommon because most
overlapping federal and state statutes are supplementary in nature-passed by the federal
government to assist the states with interstate problems. The penalties are generally
similar. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970) (federal bank robbery statute); id. § 241 (if death
results from infringement of civil rights, life sentence may be imposed).
In the few cases of overlapping state and federal statutes with widely divergent
penalties, the statutes involved usually focus on different policies. In such cases, it is
arguable that no bar would exist between the prosecutions because of such policy differ-
ences. N.Y. CPiM. PRoc. LAw § 40.20(2)(b) (McKinney 1971), MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10(l)
(a) (1962), and PRoPosED CODE §§ 707(a)(i), 708(a)(i) allow dual prosecution in cases where
the statutes involved are intended to prevent substantially different kinds of harm.
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The Appendix to this note contains a statutory draft offered as an
alternative to section 707 of the Code. Two important changes are
made in the Code. First, the discretionary clause is removed from Sec-
tion 707. Thus, upon attachment of jeopardy in state court, the federal
prosecution is barred. Second, a new section is added which allows
federal preemption of state prosecution before jeopardy attaches. In
essence, this new section is a substitute for the old discretionary clause,
but the result of the exchange is that rather than trying the defendant
twice, a decision must be made by the federal government as to where
the prosecution can most appropriately be brought. Naturally, if the
federal government decides to yield to the state, section 207 would
operate to restrain federal jurisdiction.
William E. Grauer
APPENDIX
The following statutory provisions should replace section 707 of
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code:§ 707. FoRMER PROSECUTION IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION: WHEN A
BAR
When conduct constitutes a federal offense and an offense un-
der the law of a local government or foreign nation, a prosecution
by the local government or foreign nation is a bar to a subsequent
federal prosecution under either of the following circumstances:
(a) the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction as
defined in section 704(a) and (c) or was a barring termination under
section 704(d) and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode, unless (i) the law
defining the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted
or acquitted is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or
evil from the law defining the offense for which he is subsequently
prosecuted, or (ii) the second offense was not consummated when
the first trial began; or
(b) the first prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final
order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside,
reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition which must be estab-
lished for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is sub-
sequently prosecuted.
§ 707A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN CASES OF CONCURRENT JURISDIC-
TION
When conduct constitutes a federal offense and an offense under
the law of a local government, a prosecution by the local government
may be barred by the federal government at any time prior to the
swearing in of the first witness in the local trial, provided that the
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Attorney General of the United States certifies that the interests of the
United States would be unduly harmed if the federal prosecution is
barred. In this section, "local" means of or pertaining to any of the 50
states of the United States or any political unit within any of the 50
states.
§ 708. Unchanged.
